WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: Monetary Compensation as an Alternative for
Developing Countries

Background and Introduction
When the WTO came into existence formally as an institution in 1995, 1 it was a
culmination of the process to institutionalize the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs
(GATT) which had been in operation since 1947. As an institution with Membership of
149 countries, the goal of the WTO is to facilitate the implementation, administration,
and operation of the Multilateral Trade Agreements (MTAs); to provide a forum for
negotiations among Member States; to administer the Understanding on Rules and
Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, amongst others.2

The Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes
(DSU) of the WTO has been touted as one of the biggest achievements of the Uruguay
Round of trade negotiations. 3 Its aim is to provide security and predictability to the
1

The WTO was established by the “Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organisation” signed on the 15th of April 1994 (hereinafter “Marrakesh
Agreement”), which was a culmination of the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations.
There had been 7 other rounds of trade negotiations before this, all under the General
Agreement on Trade & Tariffs (GATT)1947- see Raj Bhala & Kevin Kennedy World
Trade Law (1998) 5. The GATT 1947 was just a set of rules to facilitate trade
negotiations leading to tariff reductions. It was not a formal institution. The advent of the
WTO in 1995 changed all that and the GATT 1947 is subsumed under GATT 1994
comprising GATT 1947, several protocols & decisions, and several Understandings. In
this paper, GATT 1994 refers to the text of the GATT 1947. See generally GATT
Secretariat, The Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, The
Legal Texts (Geneva 1994) (hereafter ‘WTO Legal Text’).
2
Art 3 of the Marrakesh Agreement deals with the functions of the WTO.
3

Quoting Dewey Ballantine LLP from “Comments Concerning Review of the Dispute Settlement
Understanding of the World Trade Organization”, June 25 1998, available on
<http://www.dbtrade.com/publications/wto_comments.pdf> (accessed on April 24 2006):
“The United States identified the DSU as the cornerstone accomplishment of the Uruguay Round. In their
testimony to Congress, Ambassadors Kantor and Yerxa both repeatedly counted the new DSU among the
“most important changes” made by the Uruguay Round. See, e.g., GATT Trade Agreements):Hearing
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 103rd Cong. (January 26, 1994) (statement of Mickey
Kantor, United States Trade Representative). Jeffrey E. Garten, Under Secretary of Commerce, hailed the
improved dispute settlement mechanism as “our most important achievement.” Similarly, in the chairman’s
statement from the May 5, 1995 Quad Ministerial, the DSU was described as ‘one of the crowning
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multilateral trading system. 4 The DSU recognizes that “[t]he prompt settlement of
situations in which a Member considers that any benefits accruing to it directly or
indirectly under the covered agreements 5 are being impaired by measures taken by
another Member is essential to the effective functioning of the WTO and the maintenance
of a proper balance between the rights and obligations of Members”.6 Thus, in a situation
where one Member State is aggrieved by the illegal action of another, it can bring the
dispute before the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) 7 and avail itself of the range of
available remedies. Allowing Member States to unilaterally decide that there has been a
violation and to choose their remedies will only lead to chaos; therefore to a large extent,
remedies are regulated by the DSB. Article 23:2 of the DSU specifically provides that;
“…Members shall (a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has
occurred…except through recourse to dispute settlement…” They are therefore bound to,
“(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of
concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those
procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations…”.8

Article 3:7 of the DSU lists the alternative dispute settlement remedies. It provides that;

… [a] solution mutually acceptable to the parties to a dispute and consistent
with the covered agreements is clearly to be preferred. In the absence of a
achievements of the Uruguay Round.’ (“‘Quad’ ministers urge better service, investment rules,” Japan
Economic Newswire May 6, 1995).”
4

Art 3:2 DSU, available in the WTO Legal Text.
The ‘covered agreements’ are the annexes to the Marrakesh Agreement. Annex1A
is a compendium of the Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods (this covers 13
independent agreements), Annex 1B is the General Agreement on Trade in Services and
Annexes, while Annex 1C is the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights.
6
Article 3:3 DSU, WTO Legal Text.
7
According to Art 2:1 DSU, the Dispute Settlement Body is established to
administer the rules and procedures under the DSU, as well as the consultation and
dispute settlement provisions of the covered agreements. It has the authority to establish
panels, adopt panel and appellate body reports, maintain surveillance of implementation
of rulings and recommendations, and authorize suspension of concessions and other
obligations under the covered agreements.
8
Art 23:2 (c) DSU, WTO Legal Text.
5
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mutually agreed solution, the first objective of the dispute settlement
mechanism is usually to secure the withdrawal of the measures concerned if
these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered
agreements. The provision of compensation should be resorted to only if the
immediate withdrawal of the measure is impracticable and as a temporary
measure pending the withdrawal of the measure which is inconsistent with a
covered agreement. The last resort which this Understanding provides to
the Member invoking the dispute settlement procedures is the possibility of
suspending the application of concessions or other obligations under the
covered agreements on a discriminatory basis vis-à-vis the other Member,
subject to authorization by the DSB of such measures.9

With all these remedies in place, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is actively
being used in the resolution of disputes among WTO Members. Despite this however,
cases generally revolve around ‘the usual suspects’ i.e. the countries that have been
making the most use of dispute settlement procedures under the WTO (e.g. the United
States, the European Communities, Canada, and Brazil). 10 It is a fact that the smaller
developing countries have been sorely lacking in the WTO dispute settlement
procedure.11,12
9

Emphasis mine.
United States has been a complainant in 81 cases, the EC in 70 cases, Canada in
26
cases,
and
Brazil
in
22
cases.
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm> (accessed on
March 23 2006).
11
Taking a look at the list of respondents and complainants from the WTO website<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm>, and comparing
against the list of LDCs on the UN website- <http://www.un.org/specialrep/ohrlls/ldc/list.htm>, Bangladesh is the first and only LDC that has ever brought a
complaint before the DSB; See India- Antidumping Measure on Batteries from
Bangladesh (WT/DS306). The dispute was in relation to certain anti-dumping measures
imposed by India on imports of lead acid batteries from Bangladesh. A request for
consultations was brought by Bangladesh on January 28 2004. By February 20 2006, the
parties informed the DSB of a mutually satisfactory solution to the matter: India had
terminated the measure in contention in January 2005.
12
Egypt and South Africa are the only two African countries to feature as main
parties in WTO dispute settlement and in both cases, they have been respondents- Egypt
10
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Various reasons have been cited for poor developing country participation in WTO
dispute settlement.13 Bown & Hoekman adduce several reasons why there is little or no
dispute settlement activity by developing countries. 14 First, on the import side, potential
developing country complainants are typically small consumers that are unable to affect
world prices. This means that under the current “retaliation-as-compensation” approach,
these countries will lack the capacity to impose the large political-economic welfare
losses on potential respondent countries that would generate the internal political pressure
in those countries that may be a necessary element to induce compliance with adverse
DSU rulings. One other fear which is shared by developing countries is the fear of
political ramifications should they engage a bigger country in dispute settlement. Many
poor developing countries rely on aid from the richer countries, and so would want to
avoid counter-retaliation that might affect the aid they are receiving, or disrupt existing
preferential trading arrangements, if not within the WTO then elsewhere. 15 Human
resource constraint is also one of the reasons for developing country absence from
dispute settlement. In a luncheon organized by the German Marshall Fund with the theme
“Developing Countries and WTO Dispute Settlement: A Changing Relationship”, the
speakers from the developing countries cited ‘lack of domestic capacity and legal

on
four
occasions
and
South
Africa
on
2
occasions.
See
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_by_country_e.htm> (accessed on
March 23 2006)
13
Petina Gappah, “African Countries and the WTO Dispute Settlement System”,
available
on
<http://www.tralac.org/pdf/African_Countries_and_the_WTO_Dispute_Settlement_Syst
em.rtf>; Chad P. Bown “Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Complainants,
Interested
Parties,
and
Free
Riders”
available
at
<http://people.brandeis.edu/~cbown/papers/free_ride.pdf > (accessed on March 22,
2006).
14
Chad P. Bown and Bernard M. Hoekman, “WTO Dispute Settlement and the
Missing Developing Country Cases: Engaging the Private Sector” (2005) 8 Journal of
International
Economic
Law
JIEL
861-890,
available
at
<jiel.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/full/8/4/861>.
15
See Joost Pauwelyn, “Enforcement and Countermeasures in the WTO: Rules are
Rules- Toward a More Collective Approach”, (2000) 94 American Journal of
International Law AJIL 335 at 338.
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sophistication’ as reasons why developing countries have not been making use of WTO
dispute settlement. 16

This paper argues that one of the reasons why more use is not being made of the dispute
settlement process by developing countries is the inadequacy of the existing remedies, for
their peculiar situation. The existing dispute settlement remedies are: withdrawal of the
offending measure, compensation, and suspension of equivalent concessions i.e.
retaliation. 17 But it has been found that these remedies do not always meet the
expectations of Members. The violating Member will not always remove the violation;
Compensation is hardly ever agreed on; and Retaliation is at odds with the trade
liberalization goal of the WTO and hardly benefits either party anyway. Consequently,
there is an urgent need to review the existing remedies with a view to finding alternative
remedies, particularly for developing countries. This paper is proposing monetary
compensation as an alternative dispute settlement remedy. With the current negotiations
going on as part of the Doha Round, 18 the appropriate forum is available for these
discussions to take place.

Part one discusses all the available WTO trade remedies according to their uses. Part two
takes a look at the problems with the existing remedies. Part three introduces financial
compensation as an alternative dispute settlement remedy for developing countries. Part
four focuses on the key elements to be taken into consideration in negotiating financial
compensation as a dispute settlement. Part five will discuss the arguments for and against
this proposal. The final part summarises the discussion and looks into some

16

The German Marshall Fund Trade & Development Speaker Series: Developing
Countries and WTO Dispute Settlement held on April 20 2005 in Washington DC, report
available
on
http://www.gmfus.org/trade/event/detail.cfm?id=70&parent_type=E
(accessed on April 20 2006).
17
These are provided for in Article 3:7 of the DSU and are discussed more in-depth
in Part 1 of this paper.
18
The Doha Round of Negotiations was launched in November 2001 by a
Ministerial Declaration (WT/MIN01/DEC/1) adopted on November 14 2001. Tagged the
‘Doha Development Agenda’, it has at its heart, the needs and interests of developing
country Members of the WTO.
5

recommendations for attaining financial compensation as an alternative dispute
settlement remedy.
1 Available Remedies under the WTO
The WTO is a rules-based and Member-driven organisation. By this, it means that WTO
Members make rules that guide their general conduct and expect these to be followed.
The WTO Agreements have made provision for various remedies to be employed under
different circumstances where these rules are breached. Since this paper proposes an
additional remedy to those which are already available, I would start by going through all
the existing remedies under the WTO, their applicability, as well as the mechanisms for
their implementation.

Remedies in the WTO are of two kinds. There are the ‘trade remedies’ which are distinct
from ‘dispute settlement remedies’. The trade remedies are the antidumping duty, the
countervailing duty, and safeguard actions. In the GATT 1994, Articles VI, XVI and XIX
make provision for these remedies to be available to WTO Members in certain situations.
These GATT provisions have all been subsequently expanded by other independent
Agreements which flesh out the provisions of those articles. These are dealt with in turn.
1.1

Trade Remedies

These are remedies which a WTO Member may avail itself of without recourse to dispute
settlement. These remedies provide Members with a fast and efficient means of dealing
with certain breaches of WTO obligations. While they are fast and effective in most
instances, by their nature, they do not and cannot solve most of the violations that occur.

1.1.1

Anti- dumping Duty

One of the WTO rules is that products from a Member are not to be ‘dumped’ unto the
market of another in such a way as to cause serious injury to the domestic industry
producing a like product, of the importing Member. Article VI GATT 1947 is the original
provision dealing with this situation. However, in 1979, the Tokyo Round Antidumping
Code was developed as a supplement to Article VI of the GATT; and now post- Uruguay

6

Round we have the Agreement on the Implementation of Article VI GATT (AntiDumping Agreement).

A product is to be considered as being ‘dumped’, i.e. introduced into the commerce of
another country at less than its normal value, if the export price of the product exported
from one country to another is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of
trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in the exporting country.19
Dumping is a form of unfair competition. In order to offset its harmful effects, a
contracting party may remedy the situation by levying on any dumped product, an
antidumping duty not greater in amount than the margin of dumping in respect of such
product. The margin of dumping is arrived at by the difference between the normal value
(the price of the imported product in the “ordinary course of trade” in the country of
origin or export) and export price (the price of the product in the country of import)

1.1.2

Countervailing Duty

According to Article XVI of the GATT 1994, a subsidy occurs where there is any form of
income or price support which operates directly or indirectly to increase exports of any
product from, or to reduce imports of any product into the territory of a country. This
definition of subsidy covers both export subsidies and domestic support. Subsidies are
generally a breach of WTO rules. The only acceptable subsidies are those which have
little or no distorting activity e.g. research grants, grants to fund disadvantaged regions
within a Member State, and assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities. 20
Export subsidies are expressly prohibited 21 , while domestic support is actionable if it
causes serious prejudice to the interests of another Member.22

19

Art 2:1 Agreement on Implementation of Art VI GATT (hereafter ‘Antidumping
Agreement’), WTO Legal Text.
20
Art. 8 Agreement on Subsidies & Countervailing Measures (hereafter ‘SCM
Agreement’), WTO Legal Text.
21
See generally Article XVI GATT 1994; Article 3 SCM Agreement.
22
Article5 SCM Agreement.
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Different remedies are available depending on the subsidy in question and its effect. For
instance, in a situation where the subsidy is causing an injury to the domestic industry
and is such that can be remedied by imposing a duty, the affected country has to carry out
an investigation to establish a causal link between the subsidized imports and the alleged
injury. On conclusion of the investigation, a duty (countervailing duty) to offset the effect
of the subsidy will be imposed until the removal of the subsidy. However in a situation
where the subsidy is entirely prohibited, a Member cannot impose a duty, rather it must
seek consultation and if this fails, request a Panel to decide the dispute.23

The purpose of the countervailing duty is to protect the domestic industry from the effect
of imported goods which come in cheap by virtue of the fact that they are being
subsidized. While this may protect the local industry of the importing country, it does
nothing to aid in their competitiveness in the world market. They would still lose their
share of trade in the international market as a result of the subsidy. For instance in the
US- Subsidies on Upland Cotton dispute,24 if the West African countries had decided to
investigate the alleged subsidy provided to US cotton producers and had imposed a duty
accordingly, this would only aid the cotton producers within their respective countries.
But in the world market, the countervailing duty would have no effect as the US cotton
would be cheaper thereby creating less demand for the unsubsidized and therefore more
expensive cotton from the African countries.

1.1.3

Safeguards

The third trade remedy is the use of safeguards. Unlike other WTO remedies, there need
not be a breach of a WTO obligation before a Member can make use of a safeguard
remedy. Known as “emergency action on imports of particular products”,25 a Member
may suspend or withdraw its WTO obligations (e.g. by imposing quantitative restrictions,
or increasing tariffs) where a product is being imported into its territory in such quantity
as to cause or threaten serious injury to its domestic market. This is an emergency action

23
24
25

Art 4 SCM Agreement.
Discussed in greater detail later in the paper.
Art XIX GATT 1994.
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which should be in use only as a temporary measure; and the Member applying the
measure is expected to consult with the affected Member before taking action. The
Agreement on Safeguards goes further to develop Article XIX of the GATT by making
provisions for investigation, 26 the determination of serious injury, 27 application of
safeguard measures, 28 and the duration of the measures. 29 In addition, a Member
proposing to apply a safeguard measure shall endeavour to maintain a substantially
equivalent level of concessions and other obligations to that existing under GATT 1994
between it and the exporting Member(s) which would be affected by such a measure.30

Even though this has the potential for being a great temporary remedy, it should be
remembered that safeguard measures designed to be used where there is a breach of
WTO obligations. Thus, as a remedy it is not useful where there has been an actual
violation of WTO obligations, making it a very limited remedy. It must be noted that
before any of the above remedies can be imposed, a thorough investigation must be
carried out. Failure to do this could result in a challenge of the actions through the dispute
settlement mechanism, particularly with respect to antidumping duty and countervailing
duty, so Members must be careful when carrying out their investigations.31

The above is a brief description of the WTO provisions for trade remedies. However,
some remedies are only available where they have been sanctioned by the Dispute
Settlement Body. These are examined in detail below.
1.2

Dispute Settlement Remedies

According to Article 3:7 of the DSU, where a matter has been successfully brought
before the DSB, the recommended remedies are the withdrawal of the measures
concerned if these are found to be inconsistent with the provisions of any of the covered

26
27
28
29
30
31

Art 3 Agreement on Safeguards.
Id Art 4.
Id Art 5.
Id Art 7.
Id Art 8.
Art 17 Antidumping Agreement; Article 30 SCM Agreement.
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agreements, the provision of compensation, and suspending the application of
concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements.

The prescribed remedy at the determination of any dispute is the withdrawal of the
offensive measure. This is the preferred solution to all disputes. The Member who is
found in breach is given “a reasonable period of time” to withdraw the measure.32 So far,
compliance with DSB recommendations has been very good. In a study done by Davey,
there has been a successful rate of implementation of Panel/ Appellate Body reports of
about 83%.33

Where a Member refuses or is unable to remove the measure within the time prescribed,
then the next best alternative is for the parties involved to negotiate compensation.
Usually this takes the form of improved market access through increased concessions. If
for instance country A is to withdraw a restriction on beef imports from another country,
it may provide trade concessions to the tune of $x ($x is the value of nullification and
impairment suffered by the complainant) to the affected Member basically by reducing
the tariffs on other products of interest to the winning Member.

The final alternative, one which is not usually encouraged is the suspension of equivalent
concessions, more commonly referred to as ‘retaliation’. In this instance, after the other
two remedies have failed, then the winning Member may bring an application to suspend
equivalent concessions i.e. retaliate. Application for an authorization to retaliate has to be
decided by arbitration pursuant to Article 22.2 DSU. One prominent case in which this
32

Art 21:3 DSU. A reasonable period of time is not defined; but see United StatesReformulated Gasoline Status Report by the United States (WT/DS2/10) where a
reasonable period of time was decided to be 15 months; United States- Measures
Affecting The Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services Award of the
Arbitrator (WT/DS285/13) where a reasonable amount of time was eleven months and 2
weeks.
33
William J. Davey, “The WTO Dispute Settlement: How Have Developing
Countries Fared?” Illinois Public Law and Legal Theory Research Papers Series
Research Paper No. 05-17, (November 30 2005) available on <
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=862804> (accessed on February 16,
2006).
10

happened is the EC- Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones) where
the United States requested authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the
European Communities and its Member States thereof, of tariff concessions and related
obligations under the GATT 1994.34
2

The Problem with WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies

In order to preserve the goodwill among Member States, the first option in any dispute
settlement procedure is always a request for consultations by the complaining Member.
The consultation is in a bid to settle the dispute amicably without the rancour associated
with formal dispute settlement. It is only when this fails that a Member may request for
the establishment of a Panel with defined terms of reference.

The Panel comes to a decision based on the submission of both parties and where a
violation is found, the recommended remedy is withdrawal of the violation. It is only
when this is not done that the other remedies become available. Admittedly, there is
usually no need to look beyond a withdrawal of the violation; most countries are willing
to allow the dispute settlement process to be effective, and so they comply with the
rulings of the DSB.35 But this is not always the case. As an example of delay or noncompliance with Panel/ Appellate Body reports, the United States- Measures Affecting
the Cross Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services case between the United
States and Antigua & Barbuda comes to mind.36 The set deadline for the United States to

34

Recourse by the United States to Article 22.2 DSU (WT/DS26/19).
DG Supachai Panitchpakdi on March 11 2005 in a speech marking 10 years of the
WTO stated as follows, “This system [dispute settlement] has largely been successful
because WTO member governments have been prepared to implement Panel and
Appellate Body rulings and to bring their laws and regulations into conformity with
WTO rules should a Panel decision go against them”,. The full text of the speech is
available on <http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/spsp_e/spsp35_e.htm> (accessed on
April 24 2006).
36
Antigua & Barbuda had requested a Panel on June 12 2003 to protest the action of
United States authorities which affected the cross-border supply of gambling and betting
services contrary to the schedule of commitments under GATS. It was decided by the
Panel and upheld by the Appellate Body that the United States measures were
inconsistent with its GATS obligations and that it had breached its National Treatment
35
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comply was April 3, 2006. The deadline passed without the United States complying with
the ruling.37 What kind of action Antigua & Barbuda will take remains to be seen.

Even where there is some semblance of compliance, the question is to what extent there
is compliance. There is usually a need for compliance-monitoring, for which there is no
formal WTO apparatus. 38 It is therefore left to the winning party to monitor the
compliance. It is not always to be taken for granted that a losing party will implement a
ruling to the full extent possible. Therefore, it falls on the winning party to follow the
measures taken by the losing party in order to ensure that the ruling is adequately
followed. This is usually a time and resource consuming responsibility. Where it is a
developing country that has just won a challenge, it will definitely be more difficult for it
to monitor compliance. Besides, even where there is full compliance, this does not
remedy the harm that had already been done.

Where there is no removal of the offensive measure then there comes a need for an
alternative remedy. According to Article 22:1 DSU, “[c]ompensation…is a temporary
measure available in the event that recommendations and rulings are not implemented
within a reasonable period of time….[c]ompensation is voluntary and if granted shall be
consistent with the covered agreements.” Compensation in WTO parlance does not mean
monetary damages the way it is understood in most legal systems. Instead, compensation
is taken to mean that the losing party grants increased concessions i.e. increased market
access to the winning party. The increased market access does not have to be in the same
sector as that leading to the dispute.39
obligation. Through arbitration it was decided that the deadline for compliance was April
3 2006. See the Appellate Body Report at WT/DS285/AB/R.
37
The United States has not started the process of amending the necessary
legislation, and at this time the deadline is past with still no action by the United States.
In a status report (WT/DS285/15/Ad1) circulated by the United States delegation to the
Chairman of the DSB dated April 11 2006, the United States claimed that it is in
compliance with the recommendations and rulings of the DSB because its existing
criminal statutes prohibit interstate transmission of gambling.
38
This is regardless of Art 21:6 of the DSU that says the DSB is to keep under
surveillance the implementation of the ruling.
39
Art 22:3 of the DSU.
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Compensation is the least used WTO trade remedy to date.40 There is only one reported
case of compensation post-dispute settlement.41 There are several possible explanations
for this. One of the main problems with compensation is that it is voluntary. What this
means is that it is up to the losing party to offer compensation which is acceptable to the
winner. A Member that has refused to remove the inconsistent measure could dig in its
heels and offer terms which are obviously unacceptable to the winning party. Again, by
the provisions of Article 22, compensation is to be “consistent with the covered
agreements”. WTO negotiating history shows that WTO pillars like the Most Favoured
Nation Treatment (MFN) must be followed in the application of compensatory
measures.42 In other words, where a party goes through the entire process of securing a
positive ruling from the DSB, the remedy which it receives from the process is to be
enjoyed by all the Members of the WTO. This reeks of unfairness and is probably one of
the more compelling reasons why compensation is not usually resorted to. It is unusual
that a party would not mind going through the entire dispute settlement process and then
have to share its spoils with every other Member.
Apart from the fact that the MFN principle 43 has to be followed in providing
compensation, the DSU has another provision that makes it obligatory to make the
measures resulting from negotiations on compensation generally applicable. Article 3:5
DSU states that “… [a]ll solutions to matters formally raised under the consultation and

40

A look at the list of all WTO cases and their status reflects this. See
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_subjects_index_e.htm#top>
(accessed on March 23 2006).
41
It was in Japan- Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages (WT/DS8/AB/R;
WT/DS10/AB/R; WT/DS11/AB/R) that compensation was used for the first time in
WTO dispute settlement. As compensation for the delay in implementing the
recommendation of the DSB, Japan agreed with the United States to apply reduced tariff
rates and in some cases zero tariffs on specific items. Subsequently, similar agreements
were reached with the European Communities and Canada to receive at least comparable
tariff concessions as that granted to the United States.
42

Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement- Dispute Settlement Proposal MTN.GNG/NG13/W/30
10 October 1988: “Where applied, compensation shall be on a most-favoured nation basis and shall be
aimed at the restoration of the proper balance between the rights and obligations of all Contracting Parties”.
43

See infra note 115.
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dispute settlement provisions… shall not nullify or impair benefits accruing to any
Member under those agreements…”. Giving increased concessions to one Member even
though compensatory, nullifies benefits to the other Members. ‘Nullification’ according
to GATT Article XXIII occurs in any of the following situations:
•

The failure of a contracting party to carry out its obligations,

•

The application by any other contracting party of any measure, whether or not it
conflicts with the provisions of the Agreement, and

•

The existence of any other situation.

Providing compensatory trade concessions to one country without extending same to
other Members could be argued to be a nullification of the benefits accruing to other
Members, even though the measure is not contrary to any provision of the covered
agreements. To make the point clearer, if after a dispute settlement case, the two parties
agree that compensation should take the form of reduced tariffs on a particular product
coming from the winning party’s country, what this means is that other countries
exporting those same products to the losing party still pay the old higher tariff which
would mean that their goods would be more expensive (thus leading to lower profits)
than those coming from the winning party. This is therefore a nullification of benefits
accruing to them.

It is more likely that where the recommendation of the DSB is not carried out, suspension
of concessions will be resorted to. In order to this, there must be a “request for
authorization from the DSB to suspend the application to the Member concerned of
concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements”. 44 Where the parties
cannot reach an agreement as to the level of suspension of concessions, arbitration is
resorted to, to determine the amount of nullification or impairment suffered by the
Member. 45 When this process is completed, the winning Member may retaliate by
imposing tariffs on a particular sector until the offensive measure is withdrawn. The
reason ‘retaliation’ is most often resorted to is it is not a voluntary measure and it is not
44
45

Art 22:2 DSU
.
Art 22:6 DSU.
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dependent on the Member in breach. It is a unilateral action taken by the winning
Member, which makes it easier to accomplish. It is also a better way to ensure
compliance with a ruling.

Retaliation however has its disadvantages. One major problem with it is that it is usually
another sector which is suffers the retaliatory action, and not the sector in which there
was a violation in the first place.46 For instance in the EC- Measures Concerning Meat
and Meat Products (Hormones) case, 47 the U.S retaliated on confectionaries, flowers,
vegetables etc., and so these other producers in the EU had to pay for the harm caused by
the ban on hormone treated beef from the U.S. By increasing the tariffs on particular
products, the opportunity cost of the benefit derived is too high. Increasing tariffs
necessarily means increasing the domestic prices of the goods. This makes them more
unaffordable, therefore reducing the quantity coming on, and eventually harming the
economy. It is a typical case of “biting one’s nose to spite the face”. Finally, retaliation
goes against the underlying objective of the WTO system which is generally to promote
rather than restrict international trade.48

For smaller developing countries, the effect of its retaliatory action may not be felt
especially where the violator is a Member with whom it has minimal trading relations.
Retaliatory actions are limited to suspension of concessions by the complainant within its
territory, and cannot be applied outside its borders.49
46

Art 22:7 DSU: “The arbitrator acting pursuant to paragraph 6 shall not examine
the nature of the concessions or other obligations to be suspended but shall determine
whether the level of such suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification or
impairment & the parties shall accept the arbitrator's decision as final… The DSB shall
be informed promptly of the decision of the arbitrator and shall upon request, grant
authorization to suspend concessions or other obligations where the request is consistent
with the decision of the arbitrator…”
47
WT/DS138.
48
Report by the Consultative Board to the Director-General Supachai PanitchpakdiThe Future of the WTO: Addressing Institutional Challenges in the New Millenium
(hereafter ‘Sutherland Report’) par 240.
49
As part of the discussions on possible areas of reform of the DSU, it has been
suggested that a provision should be made whereby Members can transfer its retaliatory
rights to an interested Member where it is unable to obtain compensation or disinclined to
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The time span for resolving disputes is another crucial point which diminishes the gains
of dispute settlement remedies. The dispute settlement process even with its merits is far
from being perfect. From the time when a Member requests consultation up until the time
when the measure is withdrawn, the period of time which has elapsed is anything from 13 years.50 There is bound to be a huge amount of lost trade which must have occurred
within that time and for which there is no remedy because WTO remedies are prospective
in nature.51

What is more, the existing remedies offer no relief to those actually injured i.e. the
producers and exporters carrying out the actual trading activities. The way the WTO
dispute settlement works is that it is only governments that can bring an action and not
the individual traders.52 Therefore, unless the offending measure is withdrawn, no other
remedy will alleviate the harm done to the traders. Whatever remedy is applied does not
benefit the particularly affected parties. It is either that some other parties benefit, or the
government revenue is increased. Until the dispute settlement process makes provision

exercise retaliatory right. In exchange a benefit possibly a cash payment would be
negotiated at a level not exceeding the authorized level of suspension. Such a situation
would particularly benefit small economies if they can trade retaliatory rights with larger
countries that can deal a more decisive blow on the violator through the suspension of
concessions. See “Trade and Development: The Doha Development Agenda” World
Trade
Report
2003
p177,
available
on
<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/wtr03_chap2b_e.pdf> (accessed on
April 28 2006).
50
The various time lines provided for in the various stages of dispute settlement in
the DSU reflect this: 60 days for consultation, 6-9 months for panel deliberation, 60-90
days for Appellate Body deliberations, up to 15 months as a reasonable period for
implementation of the ruling.
51
By saying that dispute settlement remedies are prospective, it means that they are
essentially ‘forward looking’. By ‘forward looking’, it means that remedies do not
become applicable and calculable until a ruling is eventually handed down, whatever the
remedy may be.
In other words, there is no remedy for the harm that has already
taken place. It is only ongoing harm (where there is refusal of compliance) that can be
remedied.
52
The WTO is made up of Member States; therefore it is these Members that can
access the dispute settlement process. However, the actual traders can lobby their
governments to institute an action on their behalf.
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for private party rights to participate, 53 some way has to be found to compensate the
individuals who actually lose by the application of the WTO inconsistent measure.

The problem with dispute remedies can be seen in several cases that have come to dispute
settlement. In the case of EC- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas, 54 after obtaining a ruling which the European Communities did not comply
with, Ecuador requested authorization by the DSB to suspend concessions or other
obligations to the European Communities under the TRIPS Agreement, the GATS and
GATT 1994 in an amount of US$450m. This request was granted although the level was
reduced to US$210m. Even though the violation was in the goods sector under the
GATT, Ecuador had to request retaliation on other sectors under other Agreements
because suspension in the goods sector was “not practicable or effective”. The problem
was with bananas, yet the EC sectors which would be punished for this were the
intellectual property and wholesale trade services sectors.
The Arbitrators in that case recognized that;55

Given the difficulties and the specific circumstances of this case which
involves a developing country Member, it could be that Ecuador may
find itself in a situation where it is not realistic or possible for it to
implement the suspension authorized by the DSB for the full amount
of the level of nullification and impairment estimated by us in all of
the sector and/or under all agreements mentioned above combined.
53

Under the International Centre on the Settlement of Investment disputes (ICSID)
Convention however, a private investor may bring an action against its host State. This is
one area in international law where private parties are allowed to bring cases against
sovereign States. The Appellate Body in US- Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products (WT/DS58/AB/R) allowed limited participation of non-governmental
parties through the use of amicus curiae briefs. These briefs are persuasive only and not
binding.
54
WT/DS27.
55
European Communities- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas- Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of
the DSU (WT/DS27/ARB/ECU)
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Apart from the fact that other sectors in the EC would have to pay the price for banana
violations, the banana exporters in Ecuador are not any better off by their government
retaliating against the EC in the area of TRIPS and GATS. The only effect is that there
might be a restoration of the balance of concessions between the two countries, but this in
itself is not sufficient because the effect is in a different area.
This same situation has arisen in the US- Gambling56 case in which Antigua & Barbuda
won its case against the U.S. The U.S did not comply with the ruling, which means that
Antigua & Barbuda will be left to come up with creative means to get back at the United
States. Even if it succeeds in doing so, the trade relations between the U.S. and Antigua
& Barbuda are not sufficient for Antigua & Barbuda to substantially threaten the United
States. 57 The point is this: Something needs to be done urgently to address these
imbalances which make it difficult for developing countries to derive any benefits from
WTO dispute settlement, even where they have taken the step of bringing the case before
the DSB.
3

Financial Compensation as an Alternative Dispute Settlement Remedy

3.1

The Aim of Monetary Compensation

Simply put, financial compensation should be considered as an alternative dispute
settlement remedy for those Members of the WTO for whom the other remedies are not
viable alternatives i.e. low-income countries. That being said, the purpose of monetary
compensation is a key factor in deciding its characteristics. It will also determine the
success of the remedy. As a remedy, what gap will financial compensation be filling?
Should it be solely to compensate for the loss which a Member has suffered as a result of
a violation? Should it be to punish the wrongdoer? Should it serve as a deterrent? Or
56

See supra note 37.
The Foreign Trade Statistics as prepared by the United States Census Bureau
shows that there was a balance of trade between the US and Antigua to the tune of
$185.5m, and in 2004 the balance of trade was $121.3 available on
<http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/c2484.html> (accessed on April 25, 2006)
57
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should it be to remedy a trade distortion? Understanding the purpose of monetary
compensation will go a long way in garnering support for it and making it effective.
Financial compensation as a remedy is not an end in itself. It is important to clarify that
removal of the violation is always the preferred option in any dispute settlement cases.
This is because it is important to maintain the certainty of the trading arrangements and
the agreements which each Member has bound itself to. Firstly, financial compensation
would act retroactively providing a remedy for an economy that suffers for the time that
an offending measure is in place.58 Second, it is a remedy that should confer a benefit on
countries that are not able to derive the benefits from ‘retaliation’; there should still be
some way in which they can derive benefits from the dispute settlement system.

So far, the proposals for monetary compensation state suggest that its aim is to provide
reparation for damages caused.59 Financial compensation must be structured in such a
way that the sum compensates the recipient i.e. the low- income country for harm
suffered. While it could be argued that this does not necessarily stop the violation, at least
it puts the other country in a better off position than if there was no monetary
compensation, and the violation was still not removed. Without financial compensation,
if there was no removal of the violation, the winning party would most probably have to
resort to retaliation. As stated earlier, retaliation does not solve the problem for most of
these low-income countries. Therefore, a monetary pay-off would remove the need to
resort to retaliation compulsorily even though this would not provide any benefits.

Monetary compensation should also serve as a compliance-inducing mechanism. If the
total figure is stiff enough, this should motivate the violator to bring its measures into
conformity with the DSB ruling as quickly as possible so as to reduce the money it would
have to keep paying. Thus, compensation should be calculated in such a way that not
only is the complainant compensated for the harm suffered, but the violator should be put
58

This is against the usual prospective nature of WTO remedies. See supra note 52.
See for e.g. Marco Bronckers and Naboth van den Broek “Financial
Compensation in the WTO: Improving the Remedies of WTO Dispute Settlement”,
(2005) 8 JIEL 101-126 at 124.
59
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in a position where it would be pressed to comply with the recommendation of the
Panel/Appellate Body.

3.2

Tracing the Origin of the Clamour for Monetary Compensation60

In 1965, an effort was made by GATT developing countries to add monetary
compensation to the list of dispute settlement remedies by proposing that monetary
damages to be paid to developing countries injured by GATT-illegal trade restrictions.
The theory of the developing country proposal for monetary compensation was that
GATT-illegal trade restrictions caused serious harms to the fragile economies of
developing countries. The developing countries argued that the prospective remedies
were not enough to remedy the harm already done. Instead, they proposed, developing
countries should be entitled to collect retroactive damages in the form of money awards.
The money damages proposal was advocated strenuously through a long series of
committee meetings. Developed countries opposed the proposal with equal conviction. At
that time, they felt that money damages were simply not possible. 61 The proposals were
however not adopted. They also proposed adding sterner sanctions for developing
country complaints e.g. monetary damages and collective trade sanctions. South Africa
and Brazil were the earliest proponents of this remedy.62

In November 1984, a proposal in this regard was put before the Council by Nicaragua,
that in the case of a matter raised by a less-developed contracting party, the
recommendations of the Contracting Parties may include measures of compensation for

60

The terms “monetary compensation” and “financial compensation” are used
interchangeably throughout this paper.
61
Robert E. Hudec, “Broadening the Scope of Remedies in WTO Dispute
Settlement”, available at <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/articles/hudecremedies.pdf>,
(accessed on April 27 2006). The proposals are contained in the GATT document series
COM.TD/F/W.1 (April 27 1965); COM.TD/F/W.4 (October 11 1965).
62
Robert E. Hudec Enforcing International Trade Law- The Evolution of the
Modern GATT Legal System (1993) 34.
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injury caused if the circumstances are serious enough to justify such measures.63 As part
of the negotiations leading to the establishment of the WTO, the case for monetary
compensation was suggested quite a number of times. For instance, in the DSU
negotiating sessions, it was proposed as part of special and differential treatment that "at
the request of a less-developed contracting party which has only limited retaliatory power
vis-à-vis major trading partners, panel reports may include an appropriate
recommendation on the amount of compensation due in case the main panel findings are
not implemented by a developed contracting party within such time-limit". 64 The
proponent of this suggestion argued that “also developed contracting parties could
request a GATT panel to include into the panel report a recommendation on the amount
of compensation due in case the main panel findings were not implemented".65

The calls for monetary compensation have not diminished with time. In the current
negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding under the Doha Round,66 the Least
Developed Countries (LDC) group has continued the push for monetary compensation. In
the LDC proposal,67 it was stated that; “…[a] strong case of monetary compensation can
be made. This remedy is important for developing and least developed countries, and for
any economy that suffers for the time that an offending measure remains in place.”
The suggestions of financial compensation as an alternative remedy have gone beyond
proposals from poor developing countries. Apparently, the WTO hierarchy has taken note
of the possibility of financial compensation as a remedy. In June 2003, the then DirectorGeneral of the WTO, Supachai Panitchpakdi commissioned a consultative board of eight
eminent persons to look at the state of the WTO as an institution, to study and clarify the
institutional challenges that the system faced and to consider how the WTO could be
63

Negotiating
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on
Dispute
MTN.GNG/NG13/W/15 (November 6 1987).
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MTN.GNG/NGl3/W/l9, p.6, para.3b.
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“Negotiating Group on Dispute Settlement Differential and More Favourable Treatment of
Developing Countries in the GATT Dispute Settlement System”- MTN.GNG/NGl3/W/27 (30 June l988),
available on <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/history/urdsu/urdsu.htm> (accessed on February 28, 2006).

66

The Doha Round which is known as the ‘Doha Development Round’ was
launched in Doha, Qatar in 2001.
67
“Negotiations on the Dispute Settlement Understanding: Proposal by the LDC
Group”- World Trade Organisation TN/DS/W/17.
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reinforced and equipped to meet them.68 In its report, the consultative board recognized
that the language of the DSU is not 100% explicitly clear that withdrawal of the offensive
measure is a mandatory obligation.69 This in turn leads to a situation where alternative
measures must be resorted to since retaliation as a remedy goes against the underlying
objective of the WTO system generally to promote rather than restrict international trade.

According to the board, one proposed solution is to allow monetary compensation from
the party required to comply with a dispute settlement report, to substitute for
compensatory market access measures by the winning aggrieved disputant. The report is
a bit guarded in its recommendation however and suggests that, “some experimentation
in this regard could be useful, but great care must be exercised to be sure that monetary
compensation is only a temporary fallback approach pending full compliance, otherwise
the ‘buy-out’ problems will occur”.70 According to the board, for poorer WTO Members,
especially the least-developed countries with their narrow participation in world trade, the
‘buy-out’ attitude could nullify the value of their pursuing dispute settlement cases.

3.3

Beneficiaries of Monetary Compensation

One recurring theme in the calls for monetary compensation as seen from the above is
that the beneficiaries should typically be least developed counties or poor developing
countries. To date, only one least developed country Member of the WTO has sought to
resolve a trade dispute through the WTO dispute settlement process by bringing a
complaint.71 According to the LDC group, this is not because these countries have no
concerns worth referring to the DSB, but rather due to the structural and other difficulties
posed by the system.72 Perhaps a record of the usage of dispute settlement will give an

68

The report of the consultative board is known as the Sutherland Report and the
full
text
is
available
on
<http://www.wto.org/English/thewto_e/10anniv_e/future_wto_e.pdf>
(accessed
on
February 2, 2006).
69
Sutherland Report para 241.
70
Id para 243.
71
See supra note 11.
72
See supra note 68.
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insight into why the calls are from this particular group. Typically, they are the ones who
have been lagging behind in making use of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
The following table shows WTO complaints grouped by income classification73,74:

Total Number of Complaints under the DSU
335

Number of Complainants by income classification, by year

High Income

Upper Middle Income

Lower Middle Income

Low Income

Year Complainants

Year Complainants

Year Complainants

Year Complainants

2005

4

2005

4

2005

2

2005

1

2004

15

2003

8

2004

1

2004

3

2003

11

2002

12

2003

6

2003

1

2002

20

2001

11

2002

3

2002

2

2001

5

2000

12

2001

6

2001

2

2000

17

1999

6

2000

5

2000

3

1999

23

1998

4

1999

2

1999

2

73

The table classifies complaining and responding parties in WTO disputes by the income level of
their economy. The classifications are based on data and terminology from the World Bank. A country's
classification is based on the World Bank classification for that country in the year in which the complaint
was brought.
74

WorldTradeLaw.net LLC.
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1998

33

1997

6

1997

2

1998

4

1997

42

1996

5

1996

6

1996

4

1996

30

1995

7

1995

4

1995

2

1995

15

An attempt was made by two African LDCs to make use of the dispute settlement
mechanism in the United States- Subsidies on Upland Cotton Dispute75 case. This case
brought to the fore, the challenges faced by LDCs in dispute settlement and raised all
over again the need for monetary compensation for poor countries. On February 6 2003,
Brazil requested the establishment of a Panel on the grounds that the U.S was in violation
of Articles 5(c), 6.3(b), (c) and (d), 3.1(a) (including item (j) of the Illustrative List of
Export Subsidies in Annex I), 3.1(b), and 3.2 of the SCM Agreement; Articles 3.3, 7.1, 8,
9.1 and 10.1 of the Agreement on Agriculture; and Article III:4 of GATT 1994. Brazil
was of the view that the U.S statutes, regulations, and administrative procedures listed
above were inconsistent with these provisions as such and as applied. Two least
developing countries, Chad and Benin Republic, participated as third parties in the case.
The Panel held, and the Appellate Body upheld its decision that the U.S was indeed in
violation of its WTO obligations.

Cotton accounts for approximately 40% of export earnings in Benin, and 30% in Chad
and Mali. 76 According to a report, American subsidies cost Africans $301m in 2001:
Mali lost 1.7% of its GDP, and 8% from its exports earnings, similarly Burkina Faso lost
1% of its GDP and 12% of its export income, while Benin lost 1.4% of its GDP and 9%

75

WT/DS267/AB/R.
“Cotton and Developing Countries: A Case Study in Policy Incoherence”
prepared
by
the
World
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Group
and
available
at
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTRANETTRADE/Resources/TradeNote10.pdf>
76
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of its export income.77 So much damage had been done to African cotton- producing
economies as a result of the United States’ export subsidies and domestic support for its
upland cotton farmers, yet none of them took the initiative to bring a complaint against
the United States. It was not until Brazil brought a complaint that Chad and Benin joined
the dispute, and only as third parties.

While the dispute on the US cotton subsidies was going on however, Benin, Burkina
Faso, Chad and Mali had prepared a joint proposal on a sectoral initiative on cotton.78
Their proposals were based on the fact that African cotton producers take huge losses on
their cotton because certain Member countries of the WTO continue to apply support
measures that distort global market prices and African countries cannot compete in giving
the same level support to their cotton producers. Their proposal therefore is that all kinds
of support should be eliminated and compensation provided until the support is
eliminated. Subsequently, they proposed monetary compensation as one of their focal
points after discarding retaliation and increased concessions as being inapplicable or
ineffective. What this means is that the countries who prepared the joint proposal
considered financial compensation to be a just remedy for the harm they have suffered. It
is possible therefore that if financial compensation had been an available remedy in
dispute settlement, these countries could have initiated a complaint.
Their proposal79 among other things, calls for:
•

A transitional measure in the form of financial compensation for cotton-producing
LDCs to offset the injury caused by the support for production and export;

•

Such financial compensation should be calculated in proportion to the subsidies
granted by countries which support their cotton production, taking into account

77

World Trade Net Newsletter, Vol. 4 No. 6 (June 2003), available on
<http://www.intracen.org/worldtradenet/docs/whatsnew/newsletters_2003/newslettervol4
no6.pdf> (accessed on March 3, 2006).
78
“WTO Negotiations on Agriculture: Poverty Reduction: Sectoral Initiative in
Favour of Cotton”- TN/AG/GEN/4 (16 May 2003). This proposal was written by Benin
Republic, Burkina Faso, Chad, and Mali under the umbrella of the African, Caribbean,
and Pacific (ACP) on the WTO negotiations on the cotton sector.
79
Id para 38.
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the direct and indirect effects of support for cotton production on the economies
of LDCs;
•

The compensation should be sufficiently high to constitute an additional incentive
to decrease or phase out subsidies as soon as possible, but this compensation will
decrease (terminate) as and when the subsidies are reduced (abolished).

3.4

Precedents for Monetary Compensation

Monetary compensation in international trade agreements is not a novel idea. There are in
existence, international trade agreements that make provision for financial compensation
as a dispute settlement remedy. Under the Unites States-Chile Free Trade Agreement,
provision is made for financial compensation. The FTA permits monetary assessments to
be substituted for retaliation in normal trade barrier cases.80 If the parties are unable to
agree on an amount, the amount of monetary assessment is set at 50% of the level of
nullification or impairment determined by the panel.81

Even under the WTO, there is one instance where financial compensation has been used
to settle a dispute. In United States- Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act, 82 the EC
contended that Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act which permits, under certain
conditions, the playing of radio and television music in public places (bars, shops,
restaurants, etc.) without the payment of a royalty fee, is inconsistent with US obligations
under Article 9(1) of the TRIPS Agreement, which requires Members to comply with
Articles 1-21 of the Berne Convention. The Panel report which was adopted on July 27
2000, found that indeed the United States had acted contrary to its obligations under
TRIPS and it did not fall under any of the exemptions provided for under TRIPS.

As a result of discussions to find a mutually acceptable resolution of the dispute, the
United States and the European Communities agreed pursuant to Article 25 of the DSU to
enter into arbitration in order to determine the level of nullification or impairment of

80
81
82

United States-Chile Free Trade Agreement Art 22.15 par 5.
Id.
WT/DS160.
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benefits caused by section 110(5)(B) of the US Copyright Act. After the arbitration, the
parties reached a temporary resolution of the dispute, which arrangement covered the
period through 20 December 2004. The terms of the arrangement were as follows:83
1. The United States would make a lump-sum payment in the amount of $3.3 million to a
fund to be set up by performing rights societies in the European Communities for the
provision of general assistance to their members and the promotion of authors' rights.
2. The Payment would serve as a mutually satisfactory temporary arrangement regarding
the dispute, for the three-year period commencing 21 December 2001.
4

Negotiating Monetary Compensation

Under the original GATT 1947, there was no provision for any kind of compensation in
the case of a refusal to withdraw an inconsistent measure. The only applicable remedy
was ‘retaliation’ after authorization had been given.84

Compensation as a remedy was developed under the WTO, and was reflected in the DSU.
Let us take a look at what the DSU says about compensation: “[i]f the Member fails to
bring the measure found to be inconsistent with a covered agreement into
compliance…such Member…shall enter into negotiations… with a view to developing
mutually acceptable compensation.” It states further that “…[c]ompensation is voluntary
and, if granted, shall be consistent with the covered agreements.” There is no
specification in the DSU as to what mutually acceptable compensation entails. WTO
jurisprudence has it however that compensation should take the form of increased
concessions.85 Various factors must be taken into consideration in developing monetary

83

US- Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act- Notification of a Mutually
Satisfactory Temporary Arrangement (WT/DS160/23).
84
Art XXIII:2 GATT 1947 provides that “…[i]f the CONTRACTING PARTIES
consider that the circumstances are serious enough to justify such action, they may
authorize a contracting party or parties to suspend the application to any other contracting
party or parties of such concessions or other obligations under this Agreement as they
determine to be appropriate in the circumstances…”
85
Joel P. Trachtman, “Building the WTO Cathedral” (February 17, 2006) 8,
available at Social Sciences Research Network: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=815844>.
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compensation as a remedy. How these issues will be dealt with to a large extent will
determine the success of the measure.

4.1

Key Elements of Financial Compensation

4.1.1

Amendment of the DSU to Accommodate Financial Compensation

To determine how financial compensation would work, it is important to establish
whether there is a provision for it under the DSU. If there is no provision for financial
compensation, it means an amendment of the DSU is necessary. To become enforceable
there must be a provision in the text of the DSU that could be understood to provide for
financial compensation. From the content of the DSU, there is nothing that precludes
compensation from being financial provided that “it is voluntary and consistent with the
covered agreements”. However, an amendment of the DSU would be necessary to make
explicit provision for financial compensation in the event of non-compliance with the
DSB ruling.86

Making financial compensation an alternative remedy has to start with defining clearly
what ‘compensation’ is under the DSU. Currently, there is no definition of compensation.
Compensation must be defined explicitly to include the provision of additional
concessions and/or financial compensation. The clause could read like this:
“compensation includes but is not limited to monetary compensation”.87

The next stage in the amendment of the DSU to accommodate financial compensation is
redefining ‘voluntary’. Looking at the current provisions, what does it mean for
compensation to be voluntary and consistent with the covered agreements? By voluntary,
it means that no party can compel the other to give or to accept compensation. One party
may offer compensation as a possible remedy but the other party is not bound to accept it.
It therefore leaves an escape route for the parties, thus making it a very unreliable
remedy. There are two alternative ways of solving the issue of voluntariness. One is that
86

Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek (2005).
The LDC proposal suggests that “there is a need to clarify that compensation
should not take the form of an enhanced market access if this will prejudice other
Members and that monetary compensation is to be preferred.”
87
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the term voluntary should be deleted totally from Article 22:1 of the DSU, like the LDC
proposal states,88 in order to reduce the freedom in it and to make it mandatory. On the
other hand, ‘voluntary’ could be qualified instead of being deleted. Since the purpose of
financial compensation is to benefit poor developing countries, then the voluntariness
should be left to the complainant and not to the respondent i.e. the complainant should
have the option of deciding whether it wants financial compensation or not.

The DSU provides further that compensation must be “consistent with the covered
agreements”. This is a very wide provision and can be interpreted in various ways but
basically it means that compensation must not go against the spirit of the WTO
agreements in generally. Tentatively, this phrase has been considered to mean that
compensation must be provided on an MFN basis.89 The MFN principle is one of the
pillars of the WTO.90 However, providing monetary compensation is not “an advantage,
favour, or immunity” which must be immediately and unconditionally granted to every
Member in the areas of custom duties and rules relating to importation and exportation.
Therefore by providing that financial compensation is to be consistent with the covered
agreements, this does not thereby imply that it is to be provided on an MFN basis. There
will therefore be no need to amend the DSU to remove that phrase.

4.1.2 Monetary Compensation as Special and Differential (S&D) Treatment
A recurring theme throughout the WTO covered agreements is the need to take into
account the special needs of its least developed Members.91 As a result of this, there are
88

See supra note 68.
See Australia’s submission during the DSB Special Session on the review of the
DSU, held on March 14, 2002. A report of the meeting is provided by the Third World
Network and is available on <http://www.twnside.org.sg/title/twe276b.htm> (accessed on
April 28 2006); see also Joost Pauwelyn (2000) AJIL 343.
90
See infra note 115. The other pillars are Market Access Commitments- Article II
GATT 1947 provides that each contracting party is to afford treatment no less favourable
than that which it has bound, to the commerce of the other contracting parties; and
National Treatment- Article III GATT 1947 provides that the products of the territory of
any contracting party shall not be subject to treatment different from that applied to like
domestic products; and Market Access Commitments.
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The preamble to the Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organisation recognizes
that; “…[t]here is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that developing countries, and especially the
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various provisions through all the covered agreements which are for the benefit of the
less developed Members of the WTO only. This treatment of less developed country
Members of the WTO is known as ‘special and differential treatment’.92
The DSU also has provisions regarding least developed Members. 93 Least developed
country Members are by virtue of that fact, entitled to special considerations which are
not available to the other Members. Advantage should be taken of this fact. To make
financial compensation an effective remedy for poor WTO Members, it should fall under
S&D treatment so that it is only this category of countries that can have access to
whatever provisions are applicable here. Not only should it be negotiated under S&D
treatment, it should be phrased differently from the general S&D treatment provisions.
For once, there must be phrased in a way that makes it a mandatory obligation. Typical
special and differential treatment provisions under the WTO are not binding. They are
only best endeavour provisions which developed countries are encouraged to apply,94 and
for which there is no remedy for failure to apply S&D treatment.

4.1.3 Calculation of Compensation
The factors to be considered in calculating financial compensation need to be
contemplated. Article 22:4 of the DSU provides that “[t]he level of the suspension of
least developed among them, secure a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the
needs of their economic development”.
92

In the recent Ministerial Meeting of the WTO in Hong Kong in 2005, par 35 of
the Ministerial Declaration specifies that all S&D treatment provisions are an integral
part of the WTO agreement and that its provisions must be reviewed with a view to
strengthening them and making them more precise, effective and operational. Par 36
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especially the five LDC proposals…” One of these proposals is that making a case for
monetary compensation.
93

Art 24:1 of the DSU provides for special procedures involving least developed country Members
thus; “[a]t all stages of the determination of the causes of a dispute and of dispute settlement procedures
involving a least-developed country Member, particular consideration shall be given to the special situation
of least-developed country Members…”
94

For instance, Art XXXVI GATT 1994 deals generally with provisions to aid the
less-developed Members. Para 8 provides that “[t]he adoption of measures to give effect
to these principles and objectives shall be a matter of conscious and purposeful effort on
the part of the contracting parties both individually and jointly”. That clause is phrased so
loosely and makes no compelling demands of the more developed Members.
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concessions or other obligations authorized by the DSB shall be equivalent to the level of
the nullification of impairment”. This same formula can be applied in calculating the
value of financial compensation. The nullification or impairment suffered by the
complainant should include actual losses as well as consequential losses.95 The amount
should be calculated from the time the inconsistent measure was put into operation until
the removal of the measure. Using this method would fulfill the aim of monetary
compensation which is to fully compensate the complainant for the loss suffered as a
result of the violation of WTO obligations by the respondent, and to act as a retrospective
remedy.
In the draft decision concerning measures in favour of cotton,96 WTO Members proposed
to establish a transitional financial compensation mechanism in favour of the cottonexporting LDCs affected by subsidies. The draft contained factors to be included in
calculating compensation: Starting on 1 January 2004, and until the domestic support
measures and subsidies granted to the production and export of cotton have been totally
dismantled, Members that have granted these subsidies will be called upon to grant
financial compensation equivalent to the amount of the loss in export revenue suffered by
the LDCs affected by these subsidies. The annual amount of compensation to be paid
shall correspond to the estimated losses suffered, calculated on the basis of the statistics
supplied by the International Cotton Advisory Committee (ICAC). The amount of the
overall financial compensation to be paid shall be adjusted in proportion to the subsidy
reduction efforts of the countries contributing to the compensation fund. The
compensation granted to the LDCs shall be calculated in proportion to their respective
shares in the production and export of cotton.
95

In actions for breach of contract, compensatory damages are calculated using
actual damages, consequential damages as well as incidental damages. The actual
damage is the amount incurred as a result of the inconsistent measure e.g. through
increased tariffs or additional expenses met in order to meet standards. Consequential
damage would be the amount of trade which is lost because of the measures e.g. if less
quantity of a product is exported as a result o f the increase in cost, resulting in reduced
profits.
96
“Draft Decision Concerning Specific Measures in Favour of Cotton with a View
to Poverty Alleviation: Communication from Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad and Mali” (22
August 2003) WT/GC/W/511.
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4.1.4

Procedural Issues

Some aspects relating to the procedure also need to be discussed. One of these issues
relates to timing. There needs to be established a time frame for when the request for
financial compensation will first be made. Financial compensation becomes an
alternative remedy where there is a refusal to comply with a ruling. A complainant who
has won a dispute does not automatically become entitled to financial compensation once
the decision is made in its favour. It is only after the time determined to be a reasonable
time for compliance with a ruling has elapsed that a request for financial compensation
can be made. As long as the ruling is complied with, there will be no requirement of
financial compensation. In the absence of this, just as in the case of retaliation, there will
need to be an arbitration proceeding to determine the amount of financial compensation.
This leads to the issue of who decides on whether financial compensation is to be paid.
Since financial compensation is a special remedy, the winning party should be allowed to
decide whether it wants compensation in the form of additional concessions, suspension
of equivalent concessions, or financial compensation.

5

The Debate on Monetary Compensation

Like any new proposal, concerns have been raised on the practicality of such a measure
and the modalities of its application. In discussing these issues, it should be borne in
mind that monetary compensation, like the present system of compensation does not
replace the obligation to comply with the DSB ruling. It is only supposed to be a
temporary measure until the violation is removed, and to compensate for the damage
already suffered while the violation was in place.

5.1

Thorny issues in monetary compensation97

Eligibility Requirements: Issues surrounding eligibility for the use of financial
compensation are likely to be potential problems of the remedy. Is monetary
compensation to be made generally applicable? Who can demand it and against whom?

97

See generally Marco Bronckers and Naboth van den Broek (2005).
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It is suggested that at its inception, it should be available at the request of low income
Members, because these are the Members who feel the impact of trade violations more,
and for whom trade retaliation will not be a viable option.98 This then raises the question
of the classification of low income countries. The United Nations has a classification of
countries according to development levels, while the World Bank also has its own
classification according to income levels. It would be important to resolve which of these
classifications would be ideal in determining the eligibility for financial compensation. A
re-classification could even be done for these purposes. My suggestion is that the
classification can be done according to the share of world trade of each Member. The
WTO has trade statistics for each of its Members. A threshold should be established
according to volume of trade and any Member which falls below this threshold should be
eligible for financial compensation as an alternative remedy. Using the same logic
therefore, financial compensation will be available against every Member that does not
fall within this threshold. In other words, once a Member is not determined to be eligible
for financial compensation, it becomes liable to pay financial compensation where the
circumstances warrant it.

The remedy should only be applicable by this group and not against them. The whole
purpose of financial compensation right now is for disadvantaged countries to have an
alternative remedy available to them. It would defeat this purpose if a remedy which is
supposed to be for their benefit is used against them. Consequently, only poor WTO
Members should be able to request for financial compensation, and they should only be
able to request this against the richer Members and not against one another. Where there
is a dispute among amongst the beneficiaries of financial compensation, then they should
resort to the traditional remedy of retaliation where there is refusal to comply with a
ruling. It should be remembered that the problem of retaliation is mostly felt where the
parties are unequal trading partners. But where the parties are in the same economic
category, then retaliation will be more of a threat since the impact will be felt by the
violator/respondent and will cause it to comply with the ruling as quickly as possible.
98

See discussion earlier on the problems with the existing dispute settlement
remedies.
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Multiple Party Pay-off: The questions that arise here deal with the requirement of
monetary compensation in a situation where the claim is brought by more than one party.
Is every complainant entitled to financial compensation? What happens in a case where
some of the complainants are small economies, and the rest are not? What is the position
of parties who join the action as third parties? Are they also going to be entitled to the
monetary compensation?
Firstly, to be entitled to a remedy, a party has to be a complainant and not merely a third
party. As it stands at present and unless their rights are reviewed, third parties would have
no claim to financial compensation. Although Article 22 of the DSU99 does not speak
expressly of the ‘complainant’, but rather a party “invoking” the dispute settlement
procedures, for textual and contextual reasons it cannot be suggested that third parties
invoke such procedures. The fact that Article 10 of the DSU allows any WTO Member
having a substantial interest in a matter before a Panel (i.e. third parties) and having
notified its interest to the DSB at the time of the establishment of the Panel, to be given
an opportunity to be heard by the Panel by making written submissions does not mean,
however, that third parties thereby “invoked” the dispute settlement procedures. Third
parties are merely invited to present their views during a special session of the first
substantive meeting and their written submissions are attached to, the Panel’s report.
When participating in the proceedings only as interested parties, third parties ‘by-pass’
this essential component of the dispute settlement procedures i.e. accessing remedies.100
Therefore, they may only benefit in a systemic manner from the outcome of a Panel
decision where a Respondent does implement a Panel’s recommendations and rulings.
This is because the corrected measure will usually be of general application and thus may
be directly beneficial to Third Parties. Co-complainants should however be entitled to
financial compensation since they all ‘invoked’ the dispute settlement process.
99

Art 22 deals with compensation and suspension of concessions.
As a third party in United States- Section 110(5) of US Copyright Act see supra
note 83, Australia was a third party but was not eligible for the compensation
arrangement between the EC and the US. In the requests for the composition of an
arbitral panel to determine the level of concessions, Australia was explicitly excluded
from the proceedings.
100
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To determine what parties will be entitled to financial compensation where there is a
varied mix of complainants, the eligibility requirements as suggested above can be
resorted to. Any complainant which is not entitled to financial compensation still has the
other dispute settlement remedies available to it.
Enforceability: Limao & Saggi101 are of the opinion that the major problem facing the
implementation of a dispute remedy based on financial compensation is its
enforcement.102 Even after making a provision for financial compensation in the DSU
and the DSB has authorized the payment of compensation, it would be of no consequence
if violators refuse to pay the remedy and there is no means to ensure compliance. The
success of the remedy will depend on its enforcement. Ultimately, the violating country
has to agree to pay the fine, unlike in the case of retaliation where the violating country is
not the deciding factor. Presently under the WTO, there are no compliance-inducing
mechanisms, which is why retaliation is the remedy most resorted to where there is a
refusal to comply with a ruling.103

Although there is no reason to conclude that there will not be compliance, as there has
been a good record so far of compliance with DSB recommendations,104 one suggestion
is that a system can be established whereby each Member posts a bond of a given
amount, as part of its Membership commitments, with the understanding that its bond

101

Nuno Limao & Kamal Saggi, “Tariff Retaliation versus Financial Compensation
in the Enforcement of International Trade Agreements”, (2006) available at
<http://faculty.smu.edu/ksaggi/LIMAO-SAGGI.pdf>
102
It should be stated at this point that this problem is not peculiar to enforcement in
cases where financial compensation is the required remedy. There are generally no
enforcement provisions under the DSU. Thus finding a means of enforcing the remedy of
financial compensation should begin with finding means of enforcing DSB rulings
generally. For a discussion on enforcement of WTO rules and dispute settlement reports
generally, see Joost Pauwelyn (2000).
103
Retaliation does not require any action on the part of the respondent, and no
permission is sought from it. Once a respondent does not comply with a ruling, then the
complainant can go ahead to arbitration to determine the level of suspension of
concessions.
104
See supra note 34.
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will be used to pay a fine where there is a ruling to that effect.105 These bonds will be
posted in an escrow account so that it does not remain under the control of the Member
which posts it. A system has to be devised as to the ratio of each Member’s bond. I would
suggest that the system of Membership contributions should also be followed here. The
budget of the WTO is derived by contributions from its Members.106 These contributions
are determined according to each Member’s percentage share of international trade, based
on trade in goods, services, and intellectual property.107 Thus, the ratio of each Member’s
bond should be determined according to this system.108 Of course the beneficiaries of
financial compensation would not be required to post bonds. The purpose of the bonds is
strictly to pay financial compensation should such a situation arise and since financial
compensation is not an optional remedy against its proposed beneficiaries, there will be
no need for them to post any bond. This leaves the issue of what happens where the
amount determined as compensation exceeds the amount which has been placed as a
bond or a situation where the amount posted as bond has been exhausted and there is a
need to pay compensation. One suggestion is that the amount outstanding should be
added to the contribution of that Member. The amount outstanding as financial
compensation can be added up to the contribution of such a Member.

Another way to ensure compliance is by making a rule that where there is refusal to pay
compensation, then the Member state will no longer have the right to use the dispute
settlement process against any other Member.

Valuation problems: Another concrete problem which has been associated with
compensation is the valuation of the amount of the compensation. Should compensation
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See supra note 102.
Art VII: 2(a) of the Marrakesh Agreement. Para 4 states in particular that “[e]ach
Member shall promptly contribute to the WTO its share in the expenses of the WTO in
accordance with the financial regulations adopted by the General Council.”
107
See “The WTO”, a portal on the WTO website which provides information about
the WTO. <http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/secre_e/contrib05_e.htm>
108
The baseline figure is something that has to be worked out by economists. My
suggestion only deals with the proportion of each Member’s bond in relation to the other
Members.
106
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equal lost trade volumes only, or lost trade volumes as well as lost profits?109 From what
time should the amount of the compensation begin to be computed? Bronckers & van den
Broek argue that for monetary compensation not to end up being high amounts similar to
a fine, either lost trade volumes or lost profits should be used as the measure of
calculation.110 What this means is that only the effective losses should be computed and
not the potential gains that have been nullified and impaired.

In my opinion however, both factors should be taken into account in computing the total
figure.111 Provided punitive damages are not included, it is not enough of a reason to state
that because the amount will be too high, both indices should not be used. In normal
business disputes, damages are calculated by including actual damages, consequential
damages, and incidental damages (this is as distinct from punitive damages, which is an
additional amount imposed to punish the offender for its action). This should be taken
into consideration by a Member that refuses to remove the offending measure, and then it
is up to it decide whether it is more worthwhile to keep the violation and pay the
compensation instead. This could help to achieve one aim of financial compensation
which is to induce compliance.

The tendency of buy-out of obligations: One of the major objections to monetary
compensation is that it would allow governments to buy-out of their obligations by
providing monetary compensation. This is a possibility whereby instead of removing the
violation, a Member would opt to pay whatever amount is estimated as monetary
compensation. If this happens, it could favour the rich and powerful countries which can
afford buy- outs while retaining measures that harm and distort trade in a manner
inconsistent with the rules of the system. In turn, this will diminish the extent to which
109

In European Communities- Regime for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of
Bananas- Recourse to Arbitration by the European Communities under Article 22.6 of
the DSU (WT/DS27/ARB), when determining the level of suspension of concessions, the
Panel rejected the attempts to calculate losses in terms of lost profits. It defined the harm
as lost exports of wholesale services from the United States to the European
Communities.
110
Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek (2005).
111
See my argument under ‘calculation of compensation’.
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companies, trading and investing, can rely on the rules to provide market
predictability.112

While it is a real possibility that there would be a buy-out of obligations, it should be
remembered that payment of monetary compensation does not remove the obligation to
remove the violation. The violator still has the obligation of bringing its measures into
conformity with its obligations. Therefore, like the present system of compensation,
monetary compensation is only temporary until the violation is removed. And for the
length of time while the payments are being made, the pay-offs are likely to be more
beneficial to a poor country than a situation where it will be forced to raise tariffs in the
quest for retaliation which would be of less benefit to it. Even with a ‘buy-out’ of
obligations by the richer countries, financial compensation would solve the problem of a
lack of an effective remedy for poor developing countries.

Violation of MFN Principle: If there is one thing that the WTO protects jealously, it is the
maintenance of equity in the trading system. The preamble of GATT 1994 states in part
that its objectives are attained “...by entering into reciprocal and mutually advantageous
arrangements directed to …the elimination of discriminatory treatment in international
commerce”.113 This provision alludes to the MFN principle.114

It has been argued that the payment of financial compensation amounts to a violation of
the MFN principle and may diminish the rights of Members other than the
complainant. 115 This argument is neither here nor there. The payment of financial
compensation does not fall under any of the criteria leading to the application of MFN
112

Par 242 Sutherland Report.
Emphasis mine.
114
Art I:1 of the GATT provides that “[w]ith respect to customs duties of any kind
…, and with respect to all rules and formalities in connection with importation and
exportation, any advantage favour privilege or immunity granted by any contracting party
to any product originating in or destined for another country shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined for the
territories of all other contracting parties”.
115
Bernard O’Connor & Margareta Djordjevic, “Practical Aspects of Monetary
Compensation: The US- Copyright Case” (2005)8 JIEL 127.
113
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rules. The MFN principle applies to “customs duties of any kind and rules and formalities
in connection with importation and exportation.” The payment of a sum of money as
compensation is neither a custom duty nor a rule relating to importation and exportation,
which could confer an advantage on one country to the detriment of all others. So, the
contention that financial compensation will violate MFN is not valid.

Sharing of receipts of compensation: Another issue that has been raised in monetary
compensation is the way the receipts are going to be disbursed. I submit however that this
is not one of the staking points of the negotiations on monetary compensation. The
government that brings the case is left to decide what it does with the money. It is not up
to the losing Member, or the DSB to determine what is to be done with the money.116 The
WTO is not a development organization. If it were, then maybe it would concern itself
with what is done with the proceeds.

Although the above issues are matters that must be dealt with in relation to financial
compensation, there a lot of things to be said for financial compensation as a remedy.
Below are some of the more compelling arguments in support of monetary compensation.

5.2

Arguments for monetary compensation

Greater participation of developing countries: We should not forget that the entire idea
of monetary compensation is to provide an alternative remedy for poor developing
countries so that they can make better use of the dispute settlement process. The idea has
been generated particularly from the low-income countries who have been absent in the
dispute settlement process at the WTO, and have cited the inadequacy of remedies as one
of the reasons for their lack of participation. With this remedy in place, hopefully there
will be increased appearances in dispute settlement made by the smaller countries.
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Part of the provisions of the draft decision concerning specific measures in favour
of cotton (supra note 97) was that “…the management of financial compensations would
be the joint responsibility of the producers’ associations in the countries affected and the
competent national structures…”
39

Compliance-inducing Effect: Because of the nature of monetary compensation, it is likely
that it will induce better compliance with the ruling of the DSB. If the amount of the
compensation is stiff enough (for instance if multiple parties are to be paid and it is a
continuous payment until the violation is removed), it might make the country opt to
remove the violation rather than pay the large sum of money. Besides, in the case of
developing countries, this will probably be a better tool for inducing compliance than the
current instruments of compensation and retaliation.

Non- trade restrictive: In line with the WTO objective of facilitating trade among its
Members, monetary compensation is not trade restrictive. This is because there is no
requirement of trade rebalancing either through the provision of additional concessions or
the suspension of equivalent concessions. All that is involved is making a sum of money
available and normal trading activities continue undisrupted. Of course, the fact that the
violation was not removed still remains and that in itself is a disruption, but it should be
noted however that this particular disruption remains whichever remedy is applied, once
there is no compliance with the ruling. The objective should then be to minimize the
disruptions in the system. What retaliation does is to restrict trade to a certain level,
whereas financial compensation could avoid this situation. In addition, monetary
compensation does not distort bound trading obligations.

Appropriate apportioning of benefits and burden: Unlike the current system of
compensation and retaliation, monetary compensation does not involve a wrong
allocation of benefits and burden. In other words, there is no situation whereby one sector
which did not have anything to do with the violation in the first place derives the benefits
as per the current system of compensation; or where a sector which is not the subject of
the dispute bears the burden as in the current form of retaliation. The proceeds from the
compensation could then, if put to good use by the government, be used to ameliorate the
losses suffered by the particular sector affected by the violation. Hence, the loser
becomes the beneficiary. This option is not available under the current system of
compensation.
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Conclusion and Recommendations
While there is much to be said about the WTO remedies, there remains much to be done
particularly with respect to developing countries. In this paper, I have tried to show why
the poorer Members of the WTO have not been making use of the dispute settlement
mechanism. Also, I discussed why the present remedies are not sufficient to address all
the problems that may arise as a result of one Member’s violation of its obligations,
especially with regard to developing countries which lack retaliatory capacity.

It is in the light of these problems that financial compensation becomes a viable
alternative dispute settlement remedy. In proposing financial compensation as a remedy,
the following are my suggestions as to how it can be successfully negotiated, and the
issues that have to be resolved before it can become a reality. These include:
•

Amendment of the DSU: To give it the force of law, the DSU needs to be
amended to ensure that financial compensation is a recognized remedy available
under all the covered agreements. The developing country group needs to ensure
that financial compensation remains on the negotiating table. Since this present
round of negotiating is a development round, there is a good chance that if they
press their demands and are prepared to make some concessions, it could become
a reality.

•

Eligibility requirements: For starters, only LDCs or poor developing country
Members should be able to request financial compensation and they should only
be able to request this against the developed countries and not against one
another;

•

Procedural issues: Since the primary dispute settlement remedy is withdrawal of
the offensive measure, it is not up to the Panel/Appellate Body Members to order
the payment of financial compensation. It is only where the violator has refused to
comply with the ruling that the case for financial compensation is heard
separately.

•

Calculation of the compensation: Like in the case of retaliation, there should be an
arbitral proceeding to determine the amount that should be paid as compensation.
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the figure should be calculated based on the amount of lost trade as well as lost
profits starting from the time when the violation began up until it is removed. A
time limit should be provided for its payment i.e. until there is compliance with
the DSB ruling.
•

Enforcement of the remedy: To ensure that a decision imposing financial
compensation is followed, the use of bonds is worth exploring. Also, preventing a
Member from using the dispute settlement mechanism where it has refused to pay
financial compensation is likely to be an effective means of ensuring compliance.

Several points should be taken from the US Copyright case in future deliberations on
financial compensation:117
•

One, it shows that financial compensation under the WTO is possible. Even with
all the objections which have been raised as to the possibility of using financial
compensation, the fact that there is an example shows that there is a way of
resolving

whatever difficulties

there

might

be in

resolving financial

compensation.
•

Two, it shows that there is a way to calculate financial compensation. In this case,
an arbitration proceeding was set up to determine the level of nullification and
impairment suffered by the EC as a result of the U.S legislation.118 It was this
figure that was then used as the amount to be paid by the U.S.

•

Three, it shows that it is indeed not impossible that countries would be willing to
pay compensation. At the time of this payment, compensation was voluntary and
still the US opted to pay compensation while it was still in the process of bringing
its law into conformity with its WTO obligation.

•

Four, it shows that compensation is a temporary measure that does not remove the
obligation to remove the violation. It will be noticed that there was a time span for
the payment of this compensation. It was expected that the dispute would still be
resolved, and that the payment of compensation was a ‘mutually satisfactory

117

See supra note 83.
US- Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act- Award of the Arbitrator
(WT/DS160/ARB25/1).
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temporary arrangement’. Even if there were no resolution of the dispute, this
problem would apply with all the other remedies. In any case, even retaliation is
supposed to be a temporary measure until the violation is removed.119 Therefore,
also financial compensation would remain in place until the violation is removed.
•

Finally, it shows that payment of monetary compensation is not a breach of the
MFN principle. Throughout the period while the negotiations were going on as to
reaching a mutually satisfactory arrangement, Australia which was a third party in
the proceeding kept on insisting that whatever solution was reached must be
applied on an MFN basis. 120 While this would have been the case if the
compensation was in the form of concessions, it did not hold where it became
obvious that the compensation would be monetary. This goes to show that where
financial compensation is the agreed remedy, MFN would not apply. It also
supports the case that third parties are not entitled to financial compensation, or
indeed to any remedy.121

In the end, whether or not financial compensation becomes a reality depends on whether
makers of such statements as the following will pay more than lip service to their
statements: “[t]he EU is also concerned by the difficulties that developing countries face
in participating actively in the dispute settlement system. Within the framework of the
negotiations on DSU, the EU is therefore in favour of initiatives aimed at granting to
developing countries a better access to the system and providing them with the necessary
training and technical assistance”.122

119

Art 22:8 DSU.

120

Australia’s position was that there ought to be a clarification of the provisions of the DSU to the
effect that all compensation arrangements must be available to all Members on a non-discriminatory basis
and that arbitration may be used to determine the appropriate level of nullification or impairment.
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The exception is of course if the measure is withdrawn in which case the benefit
is enjoyed generally, or where the compensation is not financial in which case it has to be
applied on an MFN basis.
122
<http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/respectrules/dispute/index_en.htm>
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